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“Private agricultural marketing companies have become dominant providers of smallholder input credit in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In various countries of the region, they are today in practice the sole providers of seasonal input advances to the 
small-scale farming community.” 
IFAD (2003, p.5) 
“Trade credit from private suppliers comprised virtually all of the family farm credit and the biggest share of liabilities of 
agricultural companies [in Lithuania in 2004].” 
World Bank (2005) 
“69% of 35 billion $ credit in the Brazilian agri-food system is supply-chain credit” 
D. Alcantara, Managing Director, Banco do Brasil (March 2004) 
ABSTRACT 
Food and agricultural commodity supply chains in developing and transition countries have undergone 
tremendous changes in the past decades. An important part of these changes is the decline of state-
controlled vertical coordination in commodity chains in the 1980s and 1990s and the emergence and 
spread of private sector driven vertical coordination in more recent years. In this paper we explain the 
causes of these changes, illustrate their importance, discuss the implications for efficiency and equity, 
and provide empirical evidence on these effects from several case-studies in developing and transition
countries.  
INTRODUCTION  
Twenty-five years ago, a vast share of the poor and middle income countries, covering a large share of
the world’s agricultural areas and farmers, were characterized by state-controlled supply chains for 
agricultural and food commodities. This was most extreme in the Communist world, spreading from 
Central Europe to East Asia, where the entire agri-food system was under strict control of the state. 
However, also in many African, Latin-American and South Asian countries the state played a very 
important role in the agri-food chains. For example, in Brazil and Mexico, wholesale markets were run 
by the state (Reardon and Swinnen, 2004); in South Asia the state heavily regulated food markets and 
many African commodity markets and trade regimes were controlled by (para-)state organizations. In 
many of these countries, the state played an important role in agricultural production and marketing in
the decades after independence from colonial power. Governments in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) and 
South Asia were heavily involved in agricultural marketing and food processing through the creation 
of marketing boards, government-controlled cooperatives and parastatal processing units. These 
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government institutions were often monopoly buyers of agricultural products, especially for basic food
crops and important export crops.
30
This system of state intervention and control and, with it, the vertical coordination has undergone 
tremendous changes in the 1980s and the 1990s as a global process of liberalization induced dramatic 
changes in many of these regions
31. In the transition world, the liberalization of prices, trade and 
exchanges, the privatization of the state enterprises etc. removed much of the state control over the 
commodity chains as well as the vertical coordination in the chains. Similar processes of privatization 
and liberalization of domestic and international commodity and financial markets reduced the control 
of the state and vertical coordination in many developing and emerging economies. 
Moreover, processes of globalization have at the same time induced changes in the governance 
structure of food chains. This globalization of the food chains in transition and developing countries
has (partly) been driven by the liberalization of the trade and investment regimes in transition and 
developing countries – policy reforms which often accompanied the privatization and domestic price 
reforms – and the spread of food standards.  
First, trade liberalization caused major changes in trade of agri-food products. For example in Central 
and Eastern Europe it caused a major reorientation of the agri-food trade from “east to west”, i.e. from 
trade with the former Soviet countries to trade with western Europe, and a shift of the agri-food trade 
position from net exporters to net importers. Also the participation of developing countries in world 
agricultural trade has increased. In addition, also the structure of world agriculture trade changed 
considerably during the past decades. There has been an increase in the share of high-value products 
-mainly fish and fishery products, and fruits and vegetables – in world agricultural trade. Especially
developing countries experienced a sharp increase in such high-value exports while the importance of 
their traditional tropical export commodities – such as coffee, cocoa, and tea – has decreased (Aksoy,
2005). 
Second, the liberalization of the investment regimes induced foreign investments in agribusiness, food
industry, and further down the chain, with major implications for farmers (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
Several food sectors in Eastern Europe, such as the sugar, dairy, and retail sector, have received 
massive amounts of foreign investment, which now holds dominant market shares. A well-advertised 
example of these investments is the rapid growth of modern retail chains (“supermarkets”) in 
transition and (some) developing countries and which was triggered by the reform process in former 
state-controlled economies (Reardon and Swinnen, 2004).  
Third, associated with these changes is the spread of (private and public) food standards. Consumers 
are increasingly demanding specific quality attributes of processed and fresh food products and are 
increasingly aware of food safety issues. Food-standards are increasingly stringent, especially for fresh 
food products such as fruit and vegetables, meat, dairy products, fish and seafood products, which are
prone to food safety risks. These food quality and safety demands are most pronounced in western 
markets (and increasingly also in urban markets of low-income countries) and affect traders and 
producers in transition and developing countries through international trade.  
30  For example, in Indonesia marketing of rice was controlled by the state through the marketing board BULOG (National 
Logistical Supply Organization). Similarly, marketing of grain and other basic food crops was controlled and organized 
by government marketing boards e.g. in Malawi, through ADMARC (Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation); in Zambia, through NAMBOARD (National Agricultural Marketing Board) and in Kenya through NCPB 
(National Cereals and Produce Board). Also marketing and processing of major export crops was in many countries state-
controlled through state-owned processing and exporting companies and organizations; e.g. for cotton in Malawi, through 
CMDT (Malawi Textile Development Company), in Cameroon, through SODECOTON, in Ghana, through the Ghana 
Cotton Development Board and in Kenya through CLSMB (Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board); for tea in Kenya, 
through KTDA (The Kenyan Tea Development Cooperation); for coffee through coffee marketing boards in Uganda, 
Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia; etc.  
31  In the so-called Berg report of 1980, the World Bank argued that government marketing organizations should be reformed 
to operate on a commercial basis and the private sector should be permitted to enter agricultural marketing systems to 
provide competition and encourage efficiency. This report laid the basis for economic reforms, including privatization and 
market liberalization, which started in the late 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s in many developing countries. 
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Following the privatization, liberalization and globalization waves, new, private forms of vertical 
coordination (VC) have emerged and are growing (Swinnen, 2005, 2006). This paper analyzes and 
documents the fall of state-controlled VC and the rise of private VC and presents evidence on its 
effects in transition and developing countries.  
SOME CONCEPTS  
Vertical coordination can take various forms, which can be thought of as institutional arrangements 
varying between the two extremes of spot market exchanges (0) and full ownership integration (1). 
Within this 0-1 interval, there is a large variety of different forms of coordination and an equally vast 
literature trying to classify and explain these various forms
32. An often made distinction, which is 
useful for our purposes, is between marketing contracts and production contracts. Marketing contracts
are agreements between a contractor and a grower that specifies some form of a price (system) and 
outlet ex ante. Production contracts are more extensive forms of coordination and include detailed 
production practices, extension services, inputs supplied by the contractor, quality and quantity of a
commodity and a price.
33
Key factors determining the use of various contract forms or other forms of vertical coordination are 
the costs and uncertainties involved in the transactions, which themselves are affected by the 
economic and institutional environment, the need for asset- or transaction-specific investments, the 
frequency of interacting, commodity characteristics such as perishability, costs of measuring and 
monitoring product characteristics, uncertainty over product quality, or reliability of supplies.
 34
In the literature, VC in state-controlled systems is sometimes referred to as outgrower schemes while 
private sector VC initiatives are referred to as contract-farming (e.g. Little and Watts, 1994). We 
roughly stick to this terminology but indicate that the distinction is not always straightforward. The
public-private dichotomy is complex: a state-controlled VC scheme may be under private management 
or a private VC scheme may be supported by subsidies and public extension and research. 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FALL AND RISE OF VERTICAL 
COORDINATION  
State-controlled vertical coordination 
Vertical coordination (VC) was widespread in state-controlled food supply chains. Again this was 
most extreme in the Communist system where production at various stages and the exchange of inputs 
and outputs along the chain was coordinated and determined by the central command system. The 
agricultural supply system was fully integrated and completely state-controlled (Rozelle and Swinnen, 
2004). Production, processing, marketing, the provision of inputs and credit, retailing, etc were all 
directed by the central planning authorities. Although there were some variations in countries in the 
extent and scope of control, this was the basic system extending from Central Europe, the Soviet 
Union to China and Viet Nam.  
However also in other regions where the state played an important role in food chains vertical 
coordination was widespread. For example, many of the African parastatal organizations provided 
32  There is a significant literature on supply chains and contracting in food chains, some of it on developing and transition 
countries (see World Bank (2005) for a survey). There is also a related, mostly theoretical, literature which focuses on 
optimal contracting and interlinked markets in developing countries (e.g. Bardhan, 1989).  
33  There is important variation within “production contracts”. For example production contracts which provide inputs, credit 
and some extension to farmers is the most common form of state-controlled VC in developing countries, while production 
contracts in private VC, especially in the case of high-value products, sometimes go much further in their technical 
assistance and include also certain management decisions (such as timing of planting & harvesting; timing, quantity and 
type of fertilizer application, etc). 
34  The basic explanations draw often on the seminal work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. However, in two recent 
surveys of the literature (Hobbs and Young, 2001; and Rehber, 2000) no less than seven different strands of literature are 
identified as being important to understand and explain those differences: transaction costs economics, agency theory, 
competency/capability models, strategic management theory, convention theory, life-cycle theory, and contract 
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both inputs to farmers and purchased their outputs. Government marketing organizations and 
parastatal processing companies used VC systems with upstream suppliers. The dominant form of 
state-controlled VC was that of seasonal input and credit provisions to small farmers in return for 
supplies of primary produce. In fact, state-controlled VC was often the only source of input and credit 
provision for peasant farmers (IFAD, 2003). For example, the government marketing boards 
ADMARC in Malawi and NAMBOARD in Zambia provided seasonal inputs to peasant farmers 
deducting the value of the inputs from the payment made for marketed output at harvest time (Poulton 
et al., 1998). Also parastatal cotton companies such as CMDT in Mali, SODECOTON in Cameroon 
and the Ghana Cotton Development Board in Ghana provided credit and inputs to cotton farmers 
(Poulton et al., 1998). Also extension services were offered by the government, either implicitly within 
VC of marketing boards and parastatal processing companies – e.g. the Ghana Cotton Development 
Board – or through other channels. Also more complex and extensive systems of state-controlled VC 
existed. For example, the Ghana Cotton Development Board also provided extension services 
(Poulton, 1998) and the Kenyan Tea Development Cooperation was involved in effective control at all 
levels of the operation including planting material, production processes, quality control and extension
services (Bauman, 2000).  
In many SSA countries, state-controlled VC has been particularly important – and still remains 
important in some countries. For example in Kenya, by the mid-1980’s more than 230,000 rural 
households, or about 16% of the rural population, were involved in outgrower schemes with large 
parastatal companies and government marketing boards for the production and marketing of tea, sugar, 
oilseeds and tobacco (Baumann, 2000).  
State-controlled VC in centralized agricultural marketing systems in developing and Communist 
countries was often motivated by political motives and by objectives to provide cheap food for urban 
markets; the maximization of foreign exchange earnings; the creation of rural employment; 
ascertaining the viability of certain businesses; etc. State-controlled VC was often viewed as a way to
protect peasant farmers and stimulate rural development.  
Most analyses point at the deficiencies and inefficiencies of these systems. For example, the 
inefficiency in the processing, agribusiness, and marketing systems and in the central allocation of 
production factors are considered one of the primary causes of the inefficiency of the Soviet farming 
complex (Johnson and Brooks, 1983; Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006). Also in Africa, several studies 
conclude that state-controlled outgrower schemes were inefficient and poorly managed, which 
manifested itself, among other things, in low credit repayment rates (Warning and Key, 2002)
35.
Liberalization, privatization, and the break-down of vertical coordination 
This system of vertical coordination has undergone tremendous changes in the 1980s and the 1990s. In 
the transition world, the liberalization of exchange and prices, and the privatization of farms and 
enterprises caused the collapse of vertical coordination and caused major disruptions in the food chain.
These effects occurred most dramatically in the collapse of the state-controlled system in Central and
Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union.
36 Widespread forms of contract problems 
occurred such as long payment delays, non-payments for delivered products or non-delivery. Payment 
delays were a major problem for companies in Eastern European countries and caused major drains on 
much needed cash flow for farmers. Food companies in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s considered 
late payments one of their most important obstacles to growth (Gorton et al, 2000).  
The disruptions in relationships of farms with input suppliers and food companies also resulted in 
many farms facing serious constraints in accessing essential inputs (feed, fertilizer, seeds, capital,
35  Some studies also point at successful state-controlled VC. For example, Poulton et al. (1998) point to some large 
government outgrower schemes in a poor district in Malawi, which were successful in achieving very high repayment 
rates. Also the outgrower schemes of the Kenyan Tea Development Authority are referred to as a success story, which is 
attributed to its extensive form of VC (Bauman, 2000). 
36  Interesting, the early Chinese liberalization of the marketing and input supply system also lead to major exchange 
problems, which caused the Chinese government to make a U-turn on the reforms and reimpose state control on the 
marketing and fertilizer supply systems, which was then gradually liberalized much later (see Rozelle (1996) for an 
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etc.). Also in many developing countries privatization and market liberalization led to the decline of
input and credit supply to farms as it disrupted the working of various government-controlled 
agricultural institutions, cooperative unions and parastatal processing companies.
37 As government 
marketing boards and cooperatives have ceased to play a major role in the procurement of agricultural 
produce, so has the provision of credit and agricultural inputs through state-controlled VC. In addition,
market liberalization led to the removal of price supports and input subsidies, a reduction in 
government research and extension services, and a decline in government (subsidized) credit to the 
agricultural sector.  
The emergence of private vertical coordination  
However, following privatization and liberalization, new forms of vertical coordination have emerged 
and are growing (IFAD, 2003; Swinnen, 2006; World Bank, 2005). New forms of vertical 
coordination are no longer state-controlled but are introduced by private companies. Private traders, 
retailers, agribusinesses and food processing companies increasingly contract with farms and rural 
households to whom they provide inputs and services in return for guaranteed and quality supplies. 
This process of interlinked contracts is growing rapidly in the transition and developing world.  
The emergence and spread of private VC is caused by the combination of, on the one hand, an 
increasing demand for products of high quality and safety standards with private sector investments 
and increasing consumer incomes and demands (both domestically and through trade) and, on the 
other hand, the problems which farms face to supply such products reliably, consistently and timely to
processors and traders due to a variety of market imperfections and poor public institutions.  
Farmers in developing and transition countries face major constraints in realizing high-quality, 
consistent supplies. These include financial constraints as well as difficulties in input markets, lack of 
technical and managerial capacity etc. Specifically for high-standards products, farmers might lack the 
expertise and have no access to crucial inputs such as improved seeds. To guarantee consistent and 
quality supplies, traders and processors engage in VC to overcome farmers’ constraints.  
The importance of VC in developing and transition countries is further explained by the lack of 
efficient institutions and infrastructure to assure consistent, reliable, quality and timely supply through 
spot market arrangements. VC is in fact a private institutional response to the above described market
constraints. To overcome problems of enforcement and constraints on quality supplies, private VC 
systems are set up by processors, traders, retailers and input suppliers. 
Increasing consumer demand for quality and food safety is another driving force behind private VC in 
transition and developing countries. Investment by modern processors and retailers (supermarket 
chains) reinforces the need for supplying large and consistent volumes by their use of private 
standards and requirements of extensive supervision and control of production processes.  
Emerging empirical evidence suggests that these new forms of private VC can be an engine of 
economic growth, rural development and poverty reduction. The next section presents evidence on its 
effects in transition and developing countries.  
The Importance of Private Sector Vertical Coordination 
The importance of private VC is increasing in developing and transition countries. At the end of the 
1990s, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 80% of the corporate farms, who dominated 
farm production in these countries, sold crops on contract, and 60-85% sold animal products on 
contract; numbers which are considerably higher than the shares of farms in the US and the EU (table 
1). A survey of agri-food processors in five CIS countries (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Russia) found that food companies which used contracts with suppliers grew from slightly more than 
one-third in 1997 to almost three-quarters by 2003 (table 2). 
37  For example in Kenya, the economic reforms have led to the collapse of the National Cereals and Produce Marketing 
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Table 1: Share of farms selling on contract in Central Europe (as % of total) 
Czech  Type of Contract 
NRIF*  RIF* 
Slovak  Hungary  Bulgaria 
Individual farms         
Selling crop products on contract  4  37  29  8  5 
Selling livestock products on contract  1  13  4  10  3 
Selling animals on contract  2  7  6  na  na 
Selling on contract  5  46  35  17  7 
Corporate Farms       
Selling crop products on contract  79  82  86  42 
Selling livestock products on contract    73  83  59  23
Selling animals on contract  49  77  na  na 
Selling on contract     96  98  94  43 
*RIF = Registered individual farms ; NRIF= non-registered individual farms 
Source: Swinnen, 2005 
Table 2: Supply relationships in sourcing raw materials in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine 
and Russia, 1997-2003 (% of companies) 
Relationship  1997  1999  2001  2003 
Spot Markets 
With  all  farmers  27.2 43.5 47.1 50 
With small farmers  25  41.3  44.2  47.2 
With  larger  farmers  15.6 25.5 25.5 23.1 
Contracts 
With  all  farmers  41.3 61.7 73.1 77.4 
With  small  farmers  36.2 43.8 46.2 49.1 
With larger farmers  37  58.3  69.2  73.6 
Own  farms  6.4 8.3 17.8  26.4 
Other  agents  16.7 28.6 46.2 49.1 
Source: White and Gorton, 2004Proceedings of the FAO Workshop on Governance, Coordination and Distribution along Commodity Value Chains  53
Table 3: Farm assistance programs offered by diary companies in Central Europe 













Mlekpol Y  Y  Y  N  Y 
Mleczarnia N  Y  N  N  Y 
Kurpie Y  Y  Y  N  Y 
Mazowsze Y  Y  Y  N  N 
ICC Paslek  Y  Y  Y  N  Y 
Warmia Dairy  Y     Y  Y  Y  Y 
BULGARIA 
Merone Y(2000)  N  Y(????)  Y(1992)  N N 
Fama Y(1994)  N  Y(1994)  N  N  Y(once) 
Mlekimex  Y(1997) Y(1998) Y(1997) Y(1999)  Y(1997  Y(1998) 
Danone Y(1997)  N  Y(1998)  Y(2000)  Y(1995)  Y(1999) 
Iotovi N  N  Y(1995)  N  N  Y(1995) 
Milky  World  Y(1999) Y(2000) Y(1999) Y(1999)  N  Y(1999) 
Markelli Y(1999)  N  Y(1998)  N  N  N 
Mandra Obnova  Y(1998)  N  Y(2000)  Y(2000)  N  N 
Meggle Y(2001)  N  Y(2001)  Y(2001)  N N 
PRL N  N  N  Y(2002)  N  N 
Serdika 90  Y(1997)  N  Y(1997)  Y(1997)  N  N 
SLOVAKIA  
Liptovska Y(2000)  N  N  Y(1994)  N  N 
Mliekospol Y(1999)  N  N  Y(1992)  Y(1992)  Y(1992) 
Rajo Y(2001)  N  Y/N  Y(1992)  N  N 
Levicka Y(1998)  N  Y(1998)  Y(0000)  N Y(1998) 
Tatranska Y(2001)  N  Y(2000)  Y(0000)  N  N 
Nutricia Dairy  Y(2000)  N  N  N  N  Y(2000) 
ROMANIA 
Danone Y  Y  Y  Y 
Friesland Y  Y Y  Y 
Promilch Y  Y Y  Y 
Raraul  N     Y  Y     N 
* Either the company provides inputs and the farmer pays back later, or the company offers forward credit, which the 
farmer uses to buy inputs. 
** In Poland no distinction is made between credit for dairy-specific investments and general investments. Farm-level 
evidence shows that the dairy companies mainly support dairy-specific investments  
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There is also significant growth of supplier support measures as part of the contracts and more farms 
are getting access to these. Credit, inputs, prompt payments, transportation, and quality control are the 
most commonly offered forms of support. Over 40% of processors in the CIS sample offer credit to at 
least some of the farms that supply them; and 36% offered inputs, in 2003. In several sectors, 
including the dairy sector in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania, farm assistance programs 
offered by private dairy companies are quite extensive and include credit provisions, input supply, 
extension services, and veterinary services and in some cases bank loan guarantees (table 3). Figure 1
shows how the growth of VC is closely and positively related to the reform process in transition 
countries. 
Figure 1: Impact of economic reforms on vertical coordination (*) in the dairy sector of 

















































* Share of dairy companies providing substantive assistance to farms as part of production contracts 
** Data based on surveys in Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia (between 1994 and 2004) 
Source: Swinnen, Dries, Germenji and Noev (2005) 
In developing countries private VC is emerging and growing in many sectors. In South and Southeast 
Asia, there has been a sharp increase in VC of primary production with input suppliers and 
processing/exporting firms during the past 20 years (Gulati et al., 2005). Especially in animal 
production and dairy farming, VC is widespread. In SSA, private VC has become a dominant system 
of rural financing. For example, in Mozambique and Zambia it is virtually the only source of finance 
for agricultural households (IFAD, 2003). In Mozambique, an estimated 400,000 rural households, 
representing 12% of the rural population, are included in contract-farming (table 4). Also in Kenya 
and Zambia, a high number of rural households are producing agricultural commodities on contract 
with agro-industrial firms (table 4). The main crops that are grown under contractual arrangements in 
SSA include cotton, tobacco and horticulture crops. Also in Latin-America, VC is widespread over 
many different agricultural commodities and includes various contractual arrangements ranging from 
purely marketing contracts to production contracts with provision of inputs, credit, technical assistance 
and marketing assistance (table 5). Proceedings of the FAO Workshop on Governance, Coordination and Distribution along Commodity Value Chains  55
Table 4: Contract-farming in Sub Sahara Africa 
Country  Commodity  Number of contracted smallholders 
Kenya tea  406,000 
 sugar  200,000 
 horticulture  15,000  -  20,000 
 tobacco  >  10,000 
Zambia cotton  150,000 
 tobacco  570 
 horticulture  13,500 
Mozambique cotton  270,000 
 tobacco  100,000 
Source: IFAD, 2003
Finally, while private sector involvement has grown and the role of the government in agricultural 
production and marketing diminished, in several countries, especially in SSA, the government is still 
involved in agricultural supply chains, e.g. through minority or majority shares in privatized food 
processing companies, through state-owned banks and government credit schemes (sometimes as part 
of multipartite VC), provision of extension services, etc. Zambia is one of the only countries in SSA 
with almost complete absence of the government in production, marketing, regulation or direct 
financial contributions to the agricultural sector, although the government continues to play a major 
role in the distribution of fertilizers (IFAD, 2003).The Fall and Rise of Vertical Coordination in Commodity Chains in Developing and Transition Countries  56
Table 5: Vertical coordination in Latin-American agri-food chains  
Contracting  Vertical 
Product  Destination 
Marketing  Technical 
assistance  Credit  Inputs  Management  Integration 
Tomato(paste)    
Nicaragua Domestic  X        
Paraguay Domestic        
Ecuador Domestic          X 
Mexico Domestic  X          X 
Peru Domestic            X 
F&V              
Guyana Domestic  X         
Ecuador Domestic  X         
Trinidad & T  Domestic  X           
Mexico Export  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Guatemala Export X  X  X  X  X  X 
El Salvador  Export  X  X  X  X   
Peru Export  X          X 
Chicken    
Trinidad & T  Domestic  X  X  X  X    X 
Jamaica Domestic  X    X     
Tobacco    
Chile na  X  X  X  X   
Guatemala na  X  X  X  X   
Sugarcane    
Nicaragua Exp&Dom  X  X   X    X 
Guatemala Exp&Dom          X 
Sesame Seed    
Nicaragua Export  X    X     
Guatemala Export X         
El Salvador  Export         
Malt. barley    
Chile Domestic  X  X    X   
Peru Domestic  X    X  X   
Rice    
Trinidad & T  Domestic  X  X    X   
Paraguay na  X   X    
Dominican R  na  X         
Dairy    
Trinidad & T  Domestic  X  X  X     
Jamaica   Domestic  X         
Ecuador Domestic  X         
Source: Dirven (1996) Proceedings of the FAO Workshop on Governance, Coordination and Distribution along Commodity Value Chains  57
COMMODITY SPECIFIC VERTICAL COORDINATION PATTERNS  
In the dairy sector, we observe extensive production contracts between dairy processors and farms in 
transition countries, including the provision of credit, investment loans, animal feed, extension 
services, bank loan guarantees, etc. (Swinnen et al, 2006). This is different from the West since there 
is no production contracting going on in countries like the US. In South and Southeast Asia, VC in the
milk sector involves contracts with cooperatively owned processing and marketing units, large scale 
state-owned processing companies and with the emerging private sector (Gulati et al., 2005).  
In South and Southeast Asia, typical contract farming schemes in animal production involve feed 
millers who supply young animals, feeds, veterinary services and extension advice on credit to farmers
who provide holding sheds, dispose of waste, and provide all required labour, water and electricity 
(Gulati et al., 2005). In Thailand nearly all commercially produced broilers are produced under 
contract arrangements with private companies (Gulatie et al., 2005); and for the Philippines this is 
80% (Delgado et al., 2003). These contract schemes are either based on fees per unit of product return
for the farmer’s labour, land, buildings, water and electricity; or on guaranteed prices.  
In the sugar sector, we find, as in the developed economies, extensive marketing agreements, but the 
contracts are much more extensive in transition and developing countries, including also input 
provisions, investment loan assistance, etc. (Swinnen, Gow and Maviglia, 1999).  
In cotton, the standard model in the US and Australia, two major cotton producers, is that the cotton 
(from seed to baled cotton) remains in ownership of the producer and the processing is paid for as a 
service. In transition countries and developing countries, the dominant player in the chain is the gin
who typically contracts farms to supply seed cotton and provides them with a variety of inputs. This 
gin supply chain structure has developed in SSA countries as well as in Central Asia and involves 
quite extensive forms of private VC, with credit, seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, etc. being provided by the 
gins (Sadler, 2004). In Ghana e.g., the privatisation of the Ghana Cotton Development Board (who 
provided production inputs, extension services and guaranteed purchase of the supply to farmers under 
state-controlled VC) into the Ghana Cotton Company and market liberalization resulting in increased 
competition in the market has induced more extensive VC. Competing private companies have 
increased their services to farmers, including timely plowing services, reliable fertilizer and pesticide 
supplies, prompt payment after harvest and even plowing for farmers’ food crops (Poulton, 1998).  
In fresh fruits and vegetables, the rapid growth of modern retail chains with high demands on quality 
and timeliness of delivery is changing the supply chains in developing and transition countries. New 
supplier contracting is developing rapidly as part of retail investment and includes private VC with 
extensive farm assistance programs. In Africa, particularly in Kenya and Senegal, smallholder 
horticulture production under private contract arrangements has increased sharply after liberalisation
but in recent years smallholder production is decreasing in favour of fully-integrated corporate 
horticulture farming (Maertens et al, 2006; Humphrey et al., 2004).  
Traditional tropical products (coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber and oil palm) are traditionally grown on fully 
integrated large scale plantations because of large economies of scale in both production and 
marketing of these crops. However, these perennial crops are increasingly being grown by 
smallholders under contract farming arrangements and outgrower schemes. For example, cocoa in 
Ghana and Nigeria; rubber in Malaysia, Nigeria and Sri Lanka; coffee on the Ivory Coast, Kenya and 
Madagascar; oil-palm in West Africa and tea in Kenya and Malawi. In Kenya, half to the coffee is 
produced by smallholders (Baumann, 2000). Some of the largest outgrower schemes such as palm oil 
in the Philippines and rubber in Malaysia are state-controlled schemes involving parastatal companies 
while other schemes involve private VC. Some companies (and parastatals) combine large scale 
integrated production with contract farming and outgrower schemes in a ‘nucleus estate’ surrounded 
by outgrowers, especially when the economies of scale of the processing plant (such as for palm oil) 
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technologies, credit and extension services, either private services or priority treatment from the public 
extension services as part of multipartite VC. 
In grains VC is also elaborated and complex. In transition countries, there is extensive contracting 
going on for malting barley, but the VC is often much more extensive than in western countries, with 
brewing and malting companies vertically coordinating across several stages of the chain. Moreover, 
there is a remarkable amount of full vertical integration in wheat production in Russia and Kazakhstan,
where large agro-holdings and grain trading companies own several large grain farms in some of the 
best grain producing regions, sometimes owning 100,000s of hectares. For example, large, vertically 
integrated grain companies are the dominant types of farming in the north of Kazakhstan. Also in 
Russia VC in grains has grown rapidly after 1998, but there it was the state which was the driving 
force behind the vertical coordination.  
THE EFFECTS OF EMERGING PRIVATE VERTICAL COORDINATION  
The emergence of private VC is often mentioned as a new engine for economic growth, rural 
development and poverty reduction. In this section we review the empirical evidence on the impact of 
VC in transition and developing countries. We distinguish between efficiency effects and equity 
effects.  
Efficiency effects  
The impact of private VC systems on productivity is difficult to quantify as several other factors affect 
output simultaneously and as company level information is difficult to obtain. Still, the evidence 
suggests that successful private VC has important positive effects, both direct and indirect.  
The direct impact is on the output and productivity of the processing company that initiates vertical 
contracting and of its suppliers involved in VC schemes. Supplying farmers have experienced 
beneficial effects on output, productivity, and product quality – and ultimately on incomes – through 
better access to inputs, timely payments, and improved productivity with new investments. Case 
studies indicate that private VC programs can lead to double digit annual growth in output and 
productivity. For example, case studies of the sugar and dairy sectors in East Europe show how new 
private contracts and farm assistance programs caused output, yields, and investments to grow 
dramatically (Gow et al, 2000; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Swinnen, 2006). A major IFPRI-FAO study 
finds that contract broiler farmers are significantly more efficient and produce higher profits than 
independent farms in the Philippines and Thailand (Gulati et al., 2005). Moreover, farm profits are 
higher through lower production and marketing costs for contract farms compared to independent 
smallholders in VC schemes for milk, broilers and FFV in India (table 6). Maertens et al. (2006) find 
that the benefits from contract-farming in horticulture production in Senegal in terms of higher rural
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Table 6: Production and transaction cost of milk, broiler and vegetable production in contract 
and non-contract farming in India (Rs/ton) 
Contract farming  Non-contract farming 









Milk 5,586  100  5,686  5,728  1,442  7,170 
Broiler* 808  38  846  27,322  90  27,412 
Vegetable** 1,485  35  1,520  1,630  437  2,067 
Note: For broiler, the firm provides free chicks, feed and medicines to the contract farmers. Vegetable
costs refer to spinach. 
Source: Birthal, Joshi and Gulati, 2005. 
Figure 2: Household income (in 1,000 FCFA) from different sources for contracted and non-
contracted horticulture households in Senegal 
Source: Maertens et al., 2006 
In their survey of CIS agri-business enterprise executives, White & Gorton (2004) concluded that 
various contract support measures had caused (separately) an average increase in yields of around 10 
%. The measures with the greatest impact on yields were specialist storage (especially cooling 
equipment in the dairy sector), veterinary support and physical inputs. Specialist storage in the form of 
on-farm cooling tanks has been particularly important in raising yields and quality in the dairy sector, 
an effect also found in other countries (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). Market measures such as prompt 
payments, guaranteed prices, and market access also had large positive effects.  
Quality of output also improved due to these measures. In the case of Polish dairy farms, milk quality
rose rapidly following contract innovations by dairy processors in the mid 1990s. The share of the 
market held by highest quality milk increased from less than 30% on average in 1996 to around 80% 
on average in 2001 (figure 3). VC loans and loan guarantee programs contributed strongly to this by 
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survey made investments in the past years, including many small farmers of less than 10 cows (Dries 
and Swinnen, 2004). Dairy loans are used for investments in enlarging and upgrading the livestock 
herd (30%) and cooling tanks (56%). Moreover, dairy assistance in the form of guarantees for bank 
loans helped farm investments. Also, programs which assist farms in accessing inputs (mainly feed) 
enhance investment indirectly by lowering input costs, or reducing transaction costs in accessing 
inputs, and consequently, through improved profitability. 

























































* Dairy companies in the North East of Poland 
Source: Dries & Swinnen, 2004 
Successful state-controlled VC programs exist. However, some case-studies point out that state-
controlled VC is generally less effective in realizing farm productivity growth than private VC. For 
example, in Ghana, liberalisation of the cotton market and privatisation of the Ghana Cotton Company 
induced more extensive VC programs including timely plowing services, reliable fertilizer and 
pesticide supplies, prompt payment after harvest and even plowing for farmers’ food crops (Poulton, 
1998). As a result of improved farm assistance programs cotton production and yields increased 
dramatically (Poulton, 1998). Another example from the peanut industry in Senegal by Warning and 
Key (2002) illustrates this further. After independence in 1960 the state began the confectionary 
peanut program (ABP – Arachide de Bouche Programme) which grew into an outgrower scheme with 
32,000 farmers providing peanuts destined for direct consumption. The ABP was completely 
privatised in 1990 and VC was extended from marketing contracts under state-controlled VC to 
production contracts in which the company handles all aspects of production, including selection and 
training of contracting farmers, provision of inputs, close monitoring of production, collection and 
processing of the harvest and export of the produce, mainly to the EU. Comparing the private ABP VC 
program with the state-controlled VC program of the majority state-owned company SONACAS for 
oil-peanut processing, reveals that this state-controlled VC program has much lower yields than the 
private VC program of ABP (800 kg/ha versus 1300 kg/ha) and that they have much lower credit 
repayment rates (58% compared to 98%). In addition, participation in the ABP program was found to 
significantly increase the income of farmers and improve their living conditions. Proceedings of the FAO Workshop on Governance, Coordination and Distribution along Commodity Value Chains  61
Indirect effects emerge through (1) cross-company spillover effects and (2) household and farm 
spillover effects.  
Cross-company spillovers occur as firms competing for the same suppliers, and their fixed inputs, are 
forced to offer similar contractual arrangements. For example, in the case of the Slovak sugar sector,
competition induced other sugar processors to introduce similar contracts. With some delay, this 
resulted in increases in productivity in the rest of the sugar sector. Other studies confirm the 
importance of this competition effect. Noev et al. (2004) and Dries et al. (2004) find that, respectively, 
in the case of the Bulgarian dairy sector and in contracting by modern retail companies in Croatia, 
competition for suppliers forces other companies to replicate farm assistance programs in order to 
secure supplies. This issue of competition and cross-company spillover effects is dealt with more 
explicitly in Swinnen and Vandeplas (this volume). 
Household and farm spillovers occur as households’ risk reduces; their access to capital increases and
the productivity of non-contracted activities increases. First, VC does not only imply the provision of 
inputs, working capital and technical assistance to farmers, it also implies guaranteed sales, often at 
guaranteed prices. This comes down to decreased marketing risk for farmers. In addition, coordinating 
firms share in the production risk of farmers through ex ante provision of inputs and credit. Reduced 
production and marketing risks improves stability of farmers’ income, which is an important benefit 
for farmers operating in high risk environments and in the absence of insurance markets
38. Second, 
credit arrangements and prompt cash payments after harvest in VC programs improves farmer’s cash 
flow and access to capital. This might ease farmers’ financial constraints and benefit investment in 
other farm and non-farm activities. This effect is particularly important in the case of capital market 
imperfections. Third, contract-farming can lead to productivity spillovers on other crops, resulting 
from management advise, access to improved technologies, better input use, etc.  
A number of empirical studies provide evidence for these household spillover effects. In a study on 
VC in South and Southeast Asia, Gulati et al. (2005) show that there is significantly less variation in
yields and prices during the year for contract broiler farmers in India because they share risk with the 
contracted firm. A study on contracted vegetables in Uganda by Henson (2004) shows that there are 
important benefits for rural households from reduced risk and improved access to credit from 
vegetables production under contract in Uganda. Govereh and Tayne (2003) find important spillover 
benefits from VC in contracted cotton production on increased productivity on non-contracted 
activities.  
Another illustrative example comes from Minten et al. (2006) on the FFV sector in Madagascar, one 
of the poorest countries in the world. The vast majority of FFV export from Madagascar goes through 
one company, who has regular contracts with five supermarkets chains in Europe. The company buys 
vegetables form more than 9,000 small farmers based on contracts. The firm provides seeds, fertilizer 
and pesticides and engages in intensive monitoring and extension advice. Farmers largely benefit from 
this contract production through a combination of effects. The firm teaches farmers better technologies 
and management practices, such as the use of compost, and this results in productivity spillovers on 
rice with yields being 64% higher on plots under contract. In addition, smallholders who participate in
contract-farming have higher welfare, more stable incomes and shorter lean periods.  
There are a number of studies specifically examining the motivations of farmers to engage in contract-
production. These show that guaranteed sales and prices, access to inputs and credit are the most 
important motivations rather than direct income effects, which further proves the importance of 
household spillover effects from contract-farming. For example, table 7 shows how the dominant 
motivation for farms in Central Europe at the end of the 1990s was guaranteed access to markets (52% 
of the farms listed this as their primary motive) and to a lesser extent guaranteed prices (21%). The 
motivations for small cotton farmers in southern Kazakhstan to enter into contracts with gins are 
38  Guaranteed prices can also work counterproductive for farmers. For example, Gulati et al. (2005) point out that profits for 
contracted swine producers in the Philippines and Thailand were much lower than for independent producers in 2002. 
This was in part due to the strengthening of pork prices during the year, which did not benefit contracted farmers 
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mainly the improved access to credit (table 8). For FFV farmers in Senegal, guaranteed market access 
and access to inputs are the most important motivations for farmers to sign contracts while in 
Madagascar this is income stability and shorting of the lean period (table 9).  
Table 7: Contract Motivations for farms in Central Europe 
Czech  Slovak  Hungary  Most Important Reason for 
Contracting (%)  1999  1999  1997 
Higher prices  9  8  10 
Stable prices  7  22  33 
Guaranteed sales  64  50  43 
Pre-payment 7  13  3 
Access to credit  0  0  9 
Access to inputs and assistance  7  6  2 
Other 6  2  0 
Source: Swinnen, 2005     
Table 8: Contract Motivations for Cotton Farms in Kazachstan, 2003 




Guaranteed product sales  9  91  8 
Guaranteed price  4  96  3 
Access to pre-financing  81  19  75 
Access to quality inputs  11  89  10 
Access to technical assistance  0  100  0 
Other 4  96  3 
Source: Swinnen, 2005     
Table 9: Contract Motivations for FFV farms in Sub Sahara Africa
Madagascar  Senegal   Reasons for contracting (%) 
2004  2005 
Stable income  66  30 
Stable prices  19  45 
Higher income   17  15 
Higher prices  11 
Guaranteed sales  66 
Access to inputs & credit  60  63 
Access to new technologies  55  17 
Income during the lean period  72  37 
Source: Minten et al., 2006; Maertens et al., 2006Proceedings of the FAO Workshop on Governance, Coordination and Distribution along Commodity Value Chains  63
Equity Effects  
There are two potential equity issues with VC processes. The first concerns the distribution of rents in 
vertically coordinated food supply chains. The second concerns the participation and exclusion of 
smallholders and poorer farmers in contract-farming.
First, VC implies sharing risks, costs and benefits between the coordinating firm – mostly food 
processors, exporters and retail chains – and farmers / suppliers. By introducing an interlinked 
contract, farms can access credit, inputs, etc. which were unavailable before and processing companies
can have access to higher quality and timely supplies. Productivity and therefore income increases for
the supply chain as a whole. However, a key question is who benefits from this increase in efficiency 
and total income? If the supplier and the processor benefit, both parties share in the gains from the 
institutional innovation, and everybody is better off. However, if the processing firm can set the terms 
of the contract such that it captures most or all of the rents, the productivity growth may not benefit the 
farms; and interlinking may even bestow additional monopoly power upon the processing company. 
Contract-farming has often been criticized as being a tool for agro-industrial firms and food 
multinationals to exploit unequal power relationships with farmers and extract rents from the chain 
(Warning and Key, 2002). However, our review of empirical evidence on the effects of VC presented 
above indicates that farmers do share importantly in the benefits of contract-farming and VC.  
Second, the capacity of emerging VC in agri-food supply chains to serve as an engine of pro-poor 
economic growth critically depends on the types of farmers that are included in contract schemes. VC 
has the potential to affect the way income is distributed within a rural economy and can exacerbate 
existing patterns of economic stratification (Warning and Key, 2002). If agro-industrial firms prefer to 
contract with wealthier farmers, then poorer households will be excluded from direct benefits. There 
are three important reasons why this might be so. First, transaction costs favour larger farms in supply 
chains. Second, when some amount of investment is needed in order to contract with or supply to the 
company, small farms are often more constrained in their financial means for making necessary 
investments. Third, small farms typically require more assistance from the company per unit of output.
However, there are also reasons why agro-industrial firms do contract with smallholders and poorer 
farmers. First, the most straightforward reason is that companies have no choice. In some cases, small
farmers represent the vast majority of the potential supply base. This is, for example, the case in the 
dairy sector in Poland and Romania, and in many other sectors in Eastern European countries 
(Swinnen, 2006). Second, case studies from transition countries suggest that company preferences for 
contracting with large farms are not as obvious as one may think. While processors may prefer to deal 
with large farms because of lower transaction costs in e.g. collection and administration, contract 
enforcement may be more problematic, and hence costly, with larger farms. Processors repeatedly 
emphasized that farms’ “willingness to learn, take on board advise, and a professional attitude were 
more important than size in establishing fruitful farm-processor relationships”. Third, in some cases 
small farms may have substantive cost advantages. This is particularly the case in labour intensive, 
high maintenance, production activities with relatively small economies of scale. Fourth, processors 
may prefer a mix of suppliers in order not to become too dependent on a few large suppliers.  
Empirical studies and interviews with companies in Central and Eastern Europe and Sub Sahara Africa 
generally confirm the main hypotheses coming out of global observations: transaction costs and 
investment constraints are a serious consideration; and companies express a preference for working 
with relatively fewer, larger, and modern suppliers (Swinnen, 2006; Maertens et al., 2006). However, 
empirical observations show a very mixed picture of actual contracting, with much more small farms 
being contracted than predicted based on the arguments above. In fact, surveys in Poland, Romania 
and CIS find no evidence that small farmers have been excluded over the past six years in developing 
supply chains. In the CIS, the vast majority of companies have the same or more small suppliers in 
2003 than in 1997 (Swinnen, 2006; World Bank, 2005). Also for the peanut sector in Senegal, no 
evidence was found for a bias in the participation of farmers in contract-schemes towards better-off 
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A case-study on FFV exports from Senegal by Maertens et al. (2006) finds that relatively wealthier 
households have a better access to contracts with agro-exporting firms. However, the overall equity 
effects of VC are nuanced here. The export of FFV from Senegal to the EU have increased 
considerably during the past decade but due to increasingly stringent food standards, the VC system is
changing since the past couple of years towards fully integrated production on agro-industrial 
holdings. This has decreased contract-farming and increased employment on agro-industrial farms. 
The study shows that contract-farming is biased to household with more land, livestock and other 
assets while employment in the agro-industry is not. The effects on income, from both contract-
farming and agro-industrial employment are significantly positive but contract-farming has a large 
effect (figure 2). This suggest that, as smallholder contract-farming and large-scale industrial farming 
reach different groups of the poor, mixed VC systems are best suited to reduce adverse equity effects.